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ARE PUBLICLY SPONSORED RELIGIOUS SYMBoLS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL?: THE "REINDEER RULE" REVISITED
Allegheny County v. American Civil Liberties Union,
109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989)
I. INTRODUCTION
Allegheny County v. American Civil Liberties Union' allowed the Supreme Court
to "revisit one of its most controversial and opaque rulings."2 In Lynch v. Don-
nelly3 the Court held that a Christmas display which included a reindeer, Christ-
mas tree, and Santa Claus, as well as a nativity scene depicting the birth of Christ,
did not violate the establishment clause of the first amendment. The Court con-
cluded the overall tableau had a "secular purpose" and "effect."4 Following the
Lynch decision lower courts have struggled to apply what has been ridiculed as the
"reindeer rule."' The "reindeer rule" is that a tableau depicting the birth of Jesus
does not amount to an endorsement of religion if it includes secular symbols of
Christmas.'
Justice O'Connor prophetically warned us in her lauded concurring opinion in
Lynch that "courts must keep in mind both the fundamental place held by the Es-
tablishment Clause in our constitutional scheme and the myriad, subtle ways in
which Establishment Clause values can be eroded."7 As Professor Tribe has
stated: "At issue in Lynch .. .was whether ours is to be a society in which the
perspective on civil rights and human dignity is to be from . .. majority to mi-
nority, from insiders to outsiders -or the other way around."8 Forty-three years
after Everson v. Board of Education,9 how has Allegheny County v. American Civil
Liberties Union changed establishment clause analysis?
II. FACTS
Public property in downtown Pittsburgh was the site of two recurring holiday
displays. 0 One display featured a cr&che, donated by a Roman Catholic group and
1. 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989).
2. Sanders, Revisiting the Reindeer Rule, TIME, Dec. 12, 1988, at Law 71.
3. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
4. ld. at 681.
5. Sanders, supra note 2, at 71.
6. McGough, Menorah Wars: What the Reindeer Rule'Hath Wrought; Religious Displays on Public Grounds,
THE NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 5, 1990, at 12 [hereinafter Menorah Wars].
7. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
8. Tribe, Constitutional Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency?, 98 HARV. L. REV. 592, 611 (1985),
quoted in Comment, Lemon Reconstituted: Justice O'Connor's Proposed Modifications of the Lemon Test for Es-
tablishment Clause Violations, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REv. 465, 473.
9. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). The 1947 case of Everson v. Board of Educ. is considered the foundation for contem-
porary analysis of the establishment clause.
10. Allegheny County v. ACLU, 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989).
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bearing a sign to that effect, which depicted a Christian nativity scene.11 The
crbche was prominently displayed on the grand staircase of the Allegheny County
Courthouse. 12 At the crest of the manger was an angel bearing a banner exclaim-
ing "Gloria in Excelsis Deo."'
A second display featured the city's forty-five-foot decorated Christmas tree,
an eighteen-foot menorah, and a sign proclaiming the city's "Salute to Liberty."14
The menorah"5 was owned by a Jewish group but was erected, removed, and
stored by the city each year. 6 This display was located just outside the city-county
building.17
The Greater Pittsburgh Chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union and
seven local residents sought a permanent injunction to prevent further display of
both the creche and the menorah alleging that the displays violated the establish-
ment clause of the first amendment. 8 The district court denied the injunction, re-
lying on Lynch v. Donnelly 9 which held that the inclusion of a creche in a city's
Christmas display, in combination with a variety of other symbols, did not violate
the establishment clause.2" The court of appeals reversed, distinguishing Lynch by
holding that the creche and the menorah represented an impermissible endorse-
ment of Christianity and Judaism. 2 The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari and affirmed the decision of the court of appeals in part and reversed in
part.22 The Court held that the display of the cr&che violated the establishment
clause by impermissibly endorsing religion23 but concluded that the display of the
menorah next to the Christmas tree did not have an unconstitutional effect because
it represented a "recognition of cultural diversity."24
III. HISTORY AND LAW
The establishment clause of the first amendment states in part that "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . "..."25 An exhaustive
review of the background and history of the establishment clause would be
counter-productive for purposes of this note. This section will, therefore, focus
l1. Id. at 3094.
12. Id.
13. Id. This phrase comes from the Book of Luke, which tells of an angel appearing to the shepherds to an-
nounce the birth of the Messiah. "[Sluddenly there was with the angel a multitude of the heavenly host praising
God and saying, Glory to God in the highest ..... Id. at n.5 (quoting Luke 2:13-14 (King James)).
14. Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3095.
15. " 'Menorah' is Hebrew for 'candelabrum.' "Id. at 3095 n. 14.
16. Id. at 3097.
17. Id.
18. id. at 3097-98.
19. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
20. Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3098.
21. ACLU v. Allegheny County, 842 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1988).
22. Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3093.
23. Id. at 3105.
24. Id. at 3115.
25. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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on the development of the law pertaining to the establishment clause as it relates to
the test used by the Court in establishment clause analysis and how changes in the
test are pertinent to the present case - particularly government sponsorship of reli-
gious ceremonies or displays.
The 1947 case of Everson v. Board of Education26 is the foundation for contem-
porary analysis of the establishment clause.27 The state action at issue in Everson
was the reimbursement of money spent by parents to transport their children on
public buses to private, including parochial, schools. 28 The Court upheld the New
Jersey statute on the basis that the reimbursements were part of a broad program of
benefits granted to all citizens of the state regardless of their religious affiliation
and not to the church affiliated schools themselves.29 Justice Black, writing for the
Court, produced what has become "one of the most influential paragraphs of dicta
in all of constitutional law."3 Black stated:
The establishment of religion clause of the First Amendment means at least this:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.
Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church
against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person
can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for
church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in an amount, large or small, can be
levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be
called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion .. . .In the
words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended
to erect a wall of separation between church and State." l
"It soon became apparent that the case would be remembered more for its broad
definition of impermissible government conduct than for its holding that the first
amendment permits reimbursement for the cost of bus transportation to religious
schools."32 In the forty-three years since Everson, results in establishment clause
cases have been legendary for their inconsistencies.33 The Court has waivered as
well in its determination of the underlying rationale of establishment clause cases:
separation of church and state, neutrality, or accommodation. 4
26. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
27. The establishment clause, like most of the other guarantees of the Bill of Rights, has been incorporated
into the fourteenth amendment's due process guarantee and thereby made applicable to the states. Id. at 8.
28. Id. at3.
29. Id. at 17-18.
30. Beschle, The Conservative as Liberal: The Religion Clauses, Liberal Neutrality, and the Approach of Justice
O'Connor, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 151, 153 (1987).
31. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)).
32. Beschle, supra note 30, at 153.
33. Marshall, "We Know It When We See It" the Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 495
(1986).
34. Id. at 496 (citing Everson, 330 U.S. at 16 (separation of church and state); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S.
664, 669 (1970) (neutrality); and Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673 (accommodation)).
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In Abington School District v. Schempp35 a daily ritual of reading to school chil-
dren from the Bible was held unconstitutional. s3 It made no difference that no
child was compelled to participate.3 7 The Court established a two-part test in
Schempp to determine whether governmental action violates the establishment
clause.3 ' The Court held that: (1) the purpose of the enactment must be secular;
and (2) the primary effect of the enactment must also not advance or inhibit reli-
gion. 39 The Court thus articulated for the first time two prongs of the present
three-pronged Lemon test used in establishment clause analysis. In applying the
test to the facts in Abington the Court concluded that the Bible readings were
clearly "religious exercises . . . in violation of the command of the First Amend-
ment that the Government maintain strict neutrality, neither aiding nor opposing
religion."" The Court stated: "The place of religion in our society is an exalted
one . . . . [Ilt is not within the power of government to invade the citadel,
whether its purpose or effect be to aid or oppose, to advance or retard."41
In 1971 the Schempp two-part test became the three-part test applied by the
modern court to determine whether governmental action violates the establish-
ment clause.42 In Lemon v. Kurtzman,4" the Court held that two programs of pub-
lic aid to parochial schools violated the establishment clause. The Pennsylvania
program reimbursed private schools for the cost of books and teacher salaries in
certain secular subjects." In the other program, Rhode Island paid teachers in pri-
vate elementary schools a supplement equal to fifteen percent of their annual sal-
ary.4" The Court held that even if the primary effect of the programs was
secular -enhancing the quality of education-they violated the establishment
clause by creating "excessive entanglement between government and religion."46
Part of the "entanglement" arose from the "surveillance necessary to ensure that
teachers play a strictly nonideological role and the state supervision of nonpublic
school accounting procedures required to establish the cost of secular as distin-
guished from religious education.
47
The Court announced the three-pronged test used in reaching the Lemon deci-
sion: "First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its princi-
pal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion;
finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive governmental entanglement with
35. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
36. Id. at 203.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 222.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 225.
41. Id. at 226.
42. Beschle, supra note 30, at 156.
43. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
44. Id. at 609-10.
45. Id. at 607-08.
46. Id. at 614.
47. Id. at 603.
[Vol. 11: 1
THE "REINDEER RULE"REVISITED
religion.' "' The new third prong of the establishment clause test grew out of the
Court's decision in Walz v. Tax Commission.49 The Court in Walz upheld state tax
exemptions for religious property as well as other property devoted to nonprofit or
charitable purposes by secular organizations."0 The Court reasoned that to tax
property for religious purposes would require excessive "entanglement," more so
without an exemption scheme than with one." The exemption scheme would re-
quire government involvement in "tax valuation of church property, tax liens, tax
foreclosures, and the . . . conflicts that follow in the train of those legal proc-
esses." 2 This test has been used in all subsequent establishment cases with the
exception of Marsh v. Chambers3 and Larsen v. Valente. 4 The Court has assigned
different roles to this test in resolving establishment inquiry. 5 "At times the Court
has described the test as a helpful signpost, 6 at other times the Court has sug-
gested that it can be discarded in certain circumstances, 7 at still other times- the
Court has held that it must be rigorously applied. 5 8
A. Ceremonies and Displays
When the government conducts a ceremony or sponsors a display and there is
reference to a religious subject in the display or ceremony, the result is conflict
with the establishment clause. Authorities have distinguished this establishment
clause arena by the appellation "civil religion."59 By civil religion is meant the en-
trenchment of religion in American public life which reflects majoritarian reli-
gious beliefs. 6 It involves the incorporation of practices that carry religious
48. Id. at 612-13 (citations omitted).
49. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
50. Id. at 672-74.
5 1. Id. at 674.
52. Id.
53. 463 U.S. 783 (1983). The Court held that the practice of opening each daily session of a state legislature
with a prayer by a state-paid chaplain does not violate the establishment clause. Id. at 792-95. The Court relied
on the fact that this practice went back to the First Congress. Id. The Court largely ignored the Lemon test, and
Justice Brennan with whom Justice Marshall joined, noted in his dissent that such a practice could not stand un-
der the settled doctrine of Lemon. Id. at 797-99 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
54. 456 U.S. 228 (1982). The Court found a violation of the principle that one religion may not be favored
over another. Id. at 255. A Minnesota law which exempted all religious organizations from reporting and regis-
tration requirements applicable to other charitable organizations was amended to remove the exemption for any
religious organization receiving less than half of its total contributions from members. Id. at 230-32. The Court
determined that where one religion is preferred over another a strict scrutiny analysis must be applied rather than
the three-prong test. Id. at 246.
55. Marshall, supra note 33, at 497.
56. Id. at 497 (citing Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985)). See infra notes 111-20 and
accompanying text.
57. Marshall, supra note 33, at 497 (citing Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983)). See infra notes 63-70
and accompanying text.
58. Marshall, supra note 29, at 497 (citing Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980)). The posting of the Ten
Commandments, even though privately funded, was found to violate the establishment clause because the pur-
pose was "plainly religious." Stone, 449 U.S. at 41. Efforts to characterize the Ten Commandments in secular
terms as part of our legal heritage failed. Id. at 41-42.
59. Developments in the Law: Religion and the State, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1606, 1651 (1987) [hereinafter Reli-
gion and the State].
60. Id. at 1651.
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significance or have religious roots into public institutions and ceremonies, i.e.,
references to God in the pledge of allegiance and the national motto "In God We
Trust."61 "The ambiguous character of civil religion makes it especially difficult to
classify in establishment clause terms."62
In Marsh v. Chambers,63 the Court held that the practice of opening each daily
session of a state legislature with a prayer by a state-paid chaplain did not violate
the establishment clause.64 Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, stated:
"The opening of sessions of legislative and other deliberative public bodies with
prayer is deeply embedded in the history and tradition of this country."6" The
Court made no pretense of subjecting Nebraska's practice of legislative prayer to
the Lemon three-pronged test and concluded that if sufficiently rooted in our cul-
tural identity, a tradition could skirt the Lemon test altogether.66 The Court stated
that the practice was not an establishment of religion but rather an acknowledg-
ment of beliefs held by the people of this country.67 "[T]he Court allowed histori-
cal acceptance indirectly to validate the practice by reclassifying the practice
-precisely by virtue of its wide-spread acceptance-as an 'acknowledgment'
rather than a promotion of religion."68 Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissenting,
noted that such a practice could not stand under the principles of Lemon. 69 Marsh
should be noted as heralding the Supreme Court's emerging "accommodation" ra-
tionale in the "public sphere" of "civil religion."7
In a 1984 case, Lynch v. Donnelly,71 the Court held that the inclusion of a cr&che
in a Christmas display sponsored by the City of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, and lo-
cated in the heart of the city's shopping district did not violate the establishment
clause.72 The display included a Santa Claus house, a Christmas tree, a banner
reading "Seasons Greetings," and the infamous reindeer.73 The cr&che was com-
prised of "traditional figures, including the Infant Jesus, Mary and Joseph, angels,
shepherds, kings, and animals . . . ."" The accommodation doctrine hinted at in
Marsh7" emerged full force in Lynch. 76 The Court stated:
The concept of a wall of separation is a useful metaphor but is not an accurate de-
scription of the practical aspects of the relationship that in fact exists. The Constitu-
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1652.
63. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
64. Id. at 791.
65. Id. at 786.
66. Beschle, supra note 30, at 168.
67. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792.
68. Religion and the State, supra note 59, at 1656.
69. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 800-01 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
70. See Religion and the State, supra note 59, at 1641.
71. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 671.
74. Id.
75. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
76. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
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tion does not require complete separation of church and state; it affirmatively
mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostil-
ity toward any.
77
The Court further stated that although it previously found the three-pronged
Lemon test to be useful, the Court had repeatedly emphasized an "unwillingness to
be confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area., 78 The Court noted
that "[t]he narrow question [was] whether there was a secular purpose for Paw-
tucket's display of the cr&che" 7' and declared that the focus of the inquiry should be
on the crbche "in the context of the Christmas season.' A majority of the Court
in a 5-4 vote held the nativity display did not violate any of the Lemon prongs in the
context of the Christmas season. 81 The secular purpose of the display was to cele-
brate the holiday and depict the origins of the holiday;82 the primary effect was not
to benefit religion in general or Christianity in particular because any advance-
ment of religion was "indirect, remote, and incidental"- no more an endorsement
of religion than an exhibition of religious paintings in museums supported by the
government.83 The Court declared there was no governmental "entanglement"
since the city erected and maintained the display.84 Therefore, political divisive-
ness alone would not invalidate otherwise permissible conduct.
85
Justice O'Connor, in a concurring opinion, suggested a reformulation or refine-
ment of Lemon's first two prongs.8 She combined the "purpose" prong87 and the
"effect" prong88 into a single endorsement standard which would examine the over-
all message of the display and ask whether "irrespective of government's actual
purpose, the practice under review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or
disapproval [of religion] ."89 Justice O'Connor emphasized that endorsement
sends a message to nonadherents "that they are outsiders, not full members of the
political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are in-
siders, favored members of the political community.""0
Justice Brennan, dissenting, 9 stated: "Nothing in the history of such practices
or the setting in which the city's cr&che is presented obscures or diminishes the
77. Id. (emphasis added).
78. Id. at 679.
79. Id. at 681.
80. Id. at 679 (emphasis added).
81. Id. at 685.
82. Id. at 68 1.
83. Id. at 683.
84. Id. at 684.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
87. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. The "purpose" prong states that the government action must have a secular pur-
pose. Id.
88. Id. The "effect" prong states the principle or primary effect of the government action must neither advance
nor inhibit religion. Id.
89. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
90. Id. at 688.
91. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 694 (Brennan, J., dissenting, in which Blackmun, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ., joined).
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plain fact that Pawtucket's action amounts to an impermissible governmental en-
dorsement of a particular faith."92 He concluded that Pawtucket's valid secular ob-
jectives could be easily accomplished by other means 3 and noted that "[t]he
'primary effect' of including a nativity scene in the city's display [was] to place the
government's imprimatur of approval on the particular religious beliefs exempli-
fied by the creche ... thereby providing 'a significant symbolic benefit to reli-
gion .... ""
Notwithstanding Justice Brennan's dissent, the Lynch decision embodies the
Supreme Court's emerging "accommodation" doctrine, allowing the display of the
creche because it was but one of countless "illustrations of the Government's ac-
knowledgment of our religious heritage and government sponsorship of graphic
manifestations of that heritage. " "
B. Religion, Public Education, and Lemon
In Wallace v. Jaffree96 the Court held that an Alabama statute which authorized a
one-minute silent period at the start of each school day which was to be used for
meditation or voluntary prayer violated the establishment clause.97 The Court
stated: "[T]he individual's freedom to choose his own creed is the counterpart of
his right to refrain from accepting the creed established by the majority. [T]he in-
dividual freedom of conscience protected by the First Amendment embraces the
right to select any religious faith or none at all."98 The Court based its invalidation
of the statute on the first prong, only, of the Lemon test. The Court quoted Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion in Lynch verbatim:
"The purpose prong of the Lemon test asks whether government's actual purpose
is to endorse or disapprove of religion. The effect prong asks whether, irrespective
of government's actual purpose, the practice under review in fact conveys a message
of endorsement or disapproval. An affirmative answer to either question should
render the challenged practice invalid." 99
The majority concluded that the legislature's sole purpose in enacting the statute
was to endorse religion, a violation of the first prong of Lemon... because the pro-
vision had nonsecular purpose.10' The Court concluded that the statute was en-
acted "to convey a message of state endorsement" of prayer"0 2 and for the sole
purpose "of expressing the State's endorsement of prayer activities for one minute
92. Id. at 695.
93. Id. at 699.
94. Id. at 701. It has been suggested that "[both the O'Connor and Brennan opinions ...are essentially
paradigms of symbolic interpretation." Marshall, supra note 33, at 517.
95. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 677.
96. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
97. Id. at 61.
98. Id. at 52-53 (emphasis added).
99. Id. at 56 n.42 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
100. Id. at 56.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 59.
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at the beginning of each schoolday."'0 3 The Court thus seemingly began with a
Lemon analysis, but moved to an emphasis on the endorsement standard.
Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion in which she reiterated that "[d]e-
spite its initial promise, the Lemon test has proved problematic."" 4 She stated her
belief that "the standards announced in Lemon should be reexamined and refined
in order to make them more useful in achieving the underlying purpose of the First
Amendment."1"5 The Court demonstrated agreement by basing the Wallace deci-
sion on Justice O'Connor's refinement of the Lemon test, expressed for the first
time in her concurring opinion in Lynch. "The proper inquiry under the purpose
prong of Lemon . . . is whether the government intends to convey a message of
endorsement or disapproval of religion. "106
Justice Rehnquist in his dissent once again expressed his accommodationist
point of view and contended there was "no historical foundation for the proposi-
tion that the Framers intended to build the 'wall of separation' that was constitu-
tionalized in Everson."' 7 He further stated that the establishment clause did not
require government neutrality between religion and irreligion.' 08 The majority
opinion, concurring opinion, and dissenting opinions,"' although disagreeing on
the underlying rationale of the establishment clause, were unanimous in their
agreement that the three-pronged test as laid down in Lemon is problematic. 110
In 1985 the Court addressed the issue of sending public school teachers into pa-
rochial schools to teach special subjects. In Grand Rapids School District v.
Ball,"' a two-part legislative scheme was challenged."1 2 A Shared Time Program
provided for classes during the regular school day for non-public school students in
classrooms leased from non-public schools. 13 The teachers were full-time em-
ployees of the public schools. 14 The second program, the Community Education
Program, offered classes for both children and adults which were taught in non-
public elementary schools and commenced at the conclusion of the regular school
103. Id. at 60.
104. Id. at 68 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
105. Id. at 68-69.
106. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 691 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
107. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 106 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 113.
109. Dissenting opinions in Wallace were filed by Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and Rehnquist.
Echoing the previously examined "accommodation" theory, Chief Justice Burger stated: "It [the Alabama statute]
accommodates the purely private, voluntary religious choices of the individual pupils who wish to pray while at
the same time creating a time for nonreligious reflection for those who do not choose to pray." Id. at 89 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
110. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 68 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 89 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). "The Court's
extended treatment of the 'test' of Lemon . . . suggests a naive preoccupation with an easy, bright-line approach
for addressing constitutional issues." Id. at 108 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The secular purpose prong has
proved mercurial in application because it has never been fully defined, and we have never fully stated how the
test is to operate.").
111. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
112. id. at 375.
113. Id. at 375-76.
114. Id. at 376.
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day."I Most of the teachers were employed by the non-public schools as regular
instructors and were only part-time public school employees.116
In striking down the scheme, the Court stated: "[O]ur cases have consistently
recognized that even such praise-worthy, secular purpose [providing for the edu-
cation of school-children] cannot validate government aid to parochial schools
when the aid has the effect of promoting a single religion or religion generally ..
.,117 Grand Rapids School District was set in a Lemon framework, but marked
the first time a Court majority relied on the refined Lemon test in its decision. 1 '
The question under Justice O'Connor's refined Lemon test being "whether the pro-
gram would be perceived as endorsement, regardless of effect ... ."119 The
Court concluded that the programs might provide a crucial link of endorsement
between government and religion.' 20
Although the Court seemed to be moving steadily away from the traditional
Lemon test and toward Justice O'Connor's refined Lemon test, in a companion case
to Grand Rapids, Aguilar v. Felton, 121 the Court adhered to the three-part establish-
ment clause test enunciated in Lemon. '22 Aguilar dealt with New York City's policy
of using federal funds to pay public-payroll teachers to go into parochial schools
and teach classes to "educationally deprived children from low-income fami-
lies."' 23 The Court held that the program was "similar" in a number of respects to
the program held unconstitutional that same day in Grand Rapids. '24 The Court
based its decision primarily on the ground that "the supervisory system estab-
lished by the City of New York [for monitoring the religious content of the publicly
funded classes] inevitably results in the excessive entanglement of church and
state . ,,. "12
Justice O'Connor wrote a dissenting opinion in Aguilar, stating: "I disagree
with the Court's analysis of entanglement, and I question the utility of entangle-
ment as a separate Establishment Clause standard ...., She further stated:
115. Id.
116. Id. at 377.
117. Id. at 382 (emphasis added).
118. Marshall, supra note 33, at 520-21. What Marshall terms "symbolic interpretation" is the same as Justice
O'Connor's refined Lemon test. "Thus she would ask not whether the primary effect of a government practice is
to advance religion, but whether government conveys through that practice a message of endorsement of reli-
gion." Comment, Lemon Reconstituted: Justice O'Connor's Proposed Modifications of the Lemon Test for Estab-
lishment Clause Violations, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REv. 465, 475.
119. Marshall, supra note 33, at 521.
120. Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. at 385. It is probable that the "symbolic effect" or "endorsement standard" alone
would have rendered the scheme unconstitutional, but the programs were found invalid on other grounds as well.
Justice Brennan stated the programs "pose[d] a substantial risk of state-sponsored indoctrination." Id. at 387.
121. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
122. See id. at 410-14.
123. Id. at 404.
124. Id. at 408-09. Four members of the Court (Burger, C.J., White, Rehnquist, and O'Connor, JJ.) disagreed
with the majority view that the New York City program and the Grand Rapids Shared Time Program violated the
first amendment. Id.
125. Id. at 409.
126. Id. at 422 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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"If a statute lacks a purpose or effect of advancing or endorsing religion, I would
not invalidate it merely because it requires some ongoing cooperation between
church and state ... ."17 Justice O'Connor reiterated combining the purpose and
effect prongs of Lemon, and declared that entanglement should not remain a sepa-
rate standard for establishment clause analysis.12 Rather, all three prongs of
Lemon should be combined into the single endorsement standard.129
The primary problem of the Grand Rapids and New York statutes was that the
instruction took place in the parochial schools.13 Thus in Grand Rapids, "[t]he
symbolic union of church and state inherent in the provision of secular, state-pro-
vided instruction in the religious school buildings threatens to convey a message of
state support for religion to students and to the general public." '31 The Court held
in Aguilar that the scope and duration of New York City's Title I program would
require a permanent and pervasive state presence in sectarian schools receiving
aid.132 The Court noted such presence infringed precisely upon the establishment
clause values of excessive entanglement.133
A recent case, Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock,134 is notable for reinforcing the
supposition that the Court is moving toward a single test in determining establish-
ment clause infringement: Does the state's conduct amount to an "endorsement of
religion?" "Endorsement" is both what is intended to be communicated and what
message is actually conveyed. 3 The decision also addressed the concern, verbal-
ized in Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Lynch, that government endorse-
ment of religion sends a message to nonadherents that they are "outsiders, not full
members of the political community . "..."136 The Texas statute in question ex-
empted religious organizations from paying sales and use taxes on their religious
publications.' 37 In striking down the statute the majority stated the main test as
whether the legislation "constitutes an endorsement of one or another set of reli-
gious beliefs or of religion generally."138 The Court quoted Justice O'Connor's
concurring opinion in Wallace v. Jaffree extensively and noted that government is
prohibited from placing its authority behind religious beliefs in general or compel-
ling nonadherents to support the practices of religious organizations by "convey-
127. Id. at 430.
128. Id. at 422.
129. See id. at 429-31.
130. Id. at 411-12.
131. Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. at 397.
132. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 412-13.
133. Id. at 413.
134. 109 S. Ct. 890 (1989).
135. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
136. Id. at 688. See also id. at 701-02 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
137. Texas Monthly, 109 S. Ct. at 894.
138. Id. at 896.
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ing the message that those who do not are less than full members of the
community."
139
Texas Monthly should be contrasted with Walz v. Tax Commission. 14 The tax
exemption upheld in Walz was part of a broad scheme that did not prefer religion
over nonreligion -property owned by many types of non-profit organizations
were also exempted.14' In Texas Monthly, only writings published by religious
groups concerning religious subject matter were exempted.142 Therefore, the ex-
emption's principle effect was to advance or endorse religion. Although the Court
appears to be unhappy with the three-pronged Lemon test and moving toward the
refined Lemon test of Justice O'Connor, the three-pronged test remains the official
standard in establishment clause cases.
IV. THE PRESENT CASE
In Allegheny County v. American CivilLiberties Union, 14 a five-justice majority
held that the crbche on the grand staircase of the Allegheny County Courthouse
violated the establishment clause. " The Court adopted Justice O'Connor's Lynch
endorsement test as the basis for the decision. 45 Justice Blackmun, writing for the
Court, stated that the Court had applied a refined version of the three-part Lemon
test in recent decisions, asking "whether the challenged governmental practice ei-
ther has the purpose or effect of 'endorsing' religion . "...146 The Court con-
cluded that Allegheny County had violated the establishment clause by choosing
"to celebrate Christmas in a way that has the effect of endorsing a patently Chris-
tian message [with regard to the cr&che] ... 147
Justice Blackmun reasoned in Part VI that "the menorah did not have the pro-
hibited effect of endorsing religion, given its particular [physical] context." 148
Justice O'Connor also concluded that the city's display of the menorah next to the
tree and a sign saluting liberty did not violate the establishment clause because the
display conveyed a message of "pluralism" which, in the particular setting, could
not be interpreted by a "reasonable observer" as an endorsement of Judaism or
Christianity or as a disapproval of alternative beliefs. 4 '
Justice Kennedy surmised that neither the menorah nor the crbche violated the
establishment clause, claiming that "[g]overnment policies of accommodation,
139. Id. (citations omitted). The Court is quoting Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38 (1985).
140. 397 U.S. 664 (1970). See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
141. Walz, 397 U.S. at 672-73.
142. Texas Monthly, 109 S. Ct. at 894.
143. 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989).
144. Id. at 3092-93. The five-Justice majority included Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and O'Con-
nor, JJ. Id.
145. Id. at 3103.
146. Id. at 3100 (emphasis added).
147. Id. at 3105. Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Rehnquist, White, and Scalia, found the cr&che did not
violate the establishment clause. Id.
148. Id. at 3115.
149. Id. at 3123-24.
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acknowledgment, and support for religion are an accepted part of our political and
cultural heritage." ' 0
Justice Brennan concurred that the crbche signified an endorsement of religion
which violated the establishment clause, but disagreed with the conclusion that the
display of the Christmas tree and menorah did not have the impermissible effect of
endorsing religion. 5 Justice Brennan stated that the notion that a Christmas tree
was secular was "shaky."152 He noted that the "attempt to take the 'Christmas' out
of the Christmas tree [was] unconvincing." '53 He further stated that the menorah
was "indisputably a religious symbol."154
Thus, the majority expressly adopted Justice O'Connor's "refined" Lemon test,
by determining that a reasonable observer, seeing the nativity display, would con-
strue the cr&che, but not the menorah, as an endorsement of religion. 55
V. ANALYSIS
A. 'What the Reindeer Rule' Hath Wrought" 156
The Court has addressed the problem of public ceremonies and displays which
include government sponsored religious symbols on two recent occasions. This
arena, deemed the public sphere of civil religion, most emphatically represents
one of what Justice O'Connor has termed "the myriad, subtle ways in which Estab-
lishment Clause values can be eroded. ' 157 A conflict exists as to whether the Court
is to maintain the position stated in Everson-that the first amendment was in-
tended to erect a wall of separation between church and state that must be kept
"high and impregnable" 158 and without the "slightest breach"1 59 - or alternatively,
whether the Court should adopt the diametrically opposed viewpoint of the Lynch
decision, that the Constitution "affirmatively mandates accommodation . . . of
all religions."' 60 The Lynch majority 61 would label such accommodation an ac-
knowledgment of our cultural heritage. 162
150. Id. at 3135 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in which Rehnquist,
C.J., Scalia and White, JJ., joined).
151. Id. at 3124 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Marshall and Stevens, JJ.,
joined).
152. d. at 3125.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 3127.
155. Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3100-01. "Endorsement" would be a perception by the observer that the govern-
ment is taking a position on the question of religious belief or" 'making adherence to a religion relevant in any
way to a person's standing in the political community.' "Id. at 3101 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. at
687).
156. Menorah Wars, supra note 6, at 12.
157. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 694 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
158. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
159. Id.
160. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673.
161. Burger, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White, Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor, JJ.,
joined. Id. at 670.
162. Id. at 677 (suggesting the Christmas tree and the cr&che have become secularized).
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B. The Test: Old Lemon v. New Lemon
Because the Court in the past has used the three-pronged Lemon test to deter-
mine establishment clause violations, accommodationists on the Court desiring to
satisfy the purpose prong - that the display have a secular purpose - could ascribe
to any religious practice or symbol the purpose of preserving tradition." 3 Thus, a
creche had a secular purpose because it was part of the tradition of Christmas,
which had become part of our cultural heritage. The Lynch decision clearly dem-
onstrated the fallibility of the Lemon purpose prong. The Court held that the
creche in the challenged display depicted the "historical origins of this traditional
event long recognized as a National Holiday."1 The Court noted that the display
had a legitimate secular purpose of celebrating a traditional holiday, and to depict
the origins of the holiday.'65 The Court ignored the fact that the creche symbol-
ized the birth of Jesus and the Christian religion's celebration of that birth. "The
Court's position, in essence, was that the government-sponsored nativity scene
was no big deal; if any non-Christians felt alienated by it, that was their prob-
lem. ''166 Professor Tribe notes that "[o]ne cannot avoid hearing in Lynch a faint
echo of the Court that found nothing invidious in the Jim Crow policy of 'separate
but equal.' "167
Justice O'Connor's suggested "reformulation" of the Lemon test, found in recent
separate opinions, 68 appears to satisfy one of the shortcomings of Lemon's pur-
pose prong: "[I]t is too easy a hurdle because it can usually be satisfied by calling
the challenged activity a tradition." '169 Justice O'Connor's test applies a single
standard and asks whether, irrespective of government's purpose, the practice be-
ing challenged in fact has the effect of communicating "a message of [governmen-
tal] endorsement or disapproval [of religion].""17 The O'Connor test, which
focuses on the perceived effect of the message, rather than the purpose behind the
message, provides a more effective and honest means of evaluating establishment
clause problems than the traditional test used by the Court in previous establish-
ment clause challenges. The new test focuses, additionally, on the establishment
clause "as guarding against majoritarian infringements on religious autonomy.
Accordingly, courts should be sensitive to the exclusionary and coercive pressures
163. Comment, Lemon Reconstituted: Justice O'Connor's Proposed Modifications of the Lemon Test for Estab-
lishment Clause Violations, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REv. 465, 475 [hereinafter Lemon Reconstituted].
164. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680.
165. Id. at 681.
166. Tribe, Constitutional Calculus: EqualJustice or Economic Efficiency?, 98 HARV. L. REv. 592,611(1985).
167. Id. (quoting Plessey v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)).
168. Religion and the State, supra note 59, at 1647. The comment states that "Justice O'Connor has developed
her views in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-90 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring), Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38, 68-70, 74-76 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment), Estate of Thornton v. Caldor,
Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 711-12 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring), and Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs., 447
U.S. 481, 493 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)." Id. at 1647 n.30.
169. Lemon Reconstituted, supra note 163, at 467.
170. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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on those who do not adhere to mainstream faiths, pressures created by the inclu-
sion of religion in public institutions or its endorsement by government." 7 '
C. The "Creche No, Menorah Yes"Decision'72
The Allegheny Court based its decision on two principles: "[Tihe government's
use of religious symbolism is unconstitutional if it has the effect of endorsing reli-
gious beliefs," "' and the effect of the government's use of religious symbolism de-
pends upon its context.'74
1. "Context"
The Court in Allegheny held that the crbche, which occupied a prominent posi-
tion on the grand staircase of the Allegheny County Courthouse, violated the es-
tablishment clause of the first amendment because, "[u]nder the Court's holding in
Lynch, the effect of a creche display turns on its setting." 7 ' The Court noted that
the task in Allegheny was "to determine whether the display of the crbche and the
menorah, in their respective 'particular settings,' ha[d] the effect of endorsing or
disapproving religious beliefs."' 76 The Court stated that nothing in the Allegheny
display detracted from the crbche's religious message. "' No figure of Santa Claus
or other decorations accompanied the figures comprising the crbche, except poin-
settia plants placed around the fence surrounding the cr&che.' 78 The Court held
that by permitting the display of the creche in that particular setting, a reasonable
observer seeing the display would conclude that the government was "endorsing
religion in general or a particular religion." 79
A different five-justice majority in Allegheny held that an eighteen-foot Hanuk-
kah menorah placed next to a forty-five-foot Christmas tree in a different part of
Pittsburgh did not violate the establishment clause.180 Again, context was the de-
termining factor. The Court reasoned that the combined display of a Christmas
tree, a menorah, and a sign saluting liberty simply recognized a holiday season
which has attained a secular status in American culture. 8 ' One publication has
paraphrased the "context" principle in the following manner: "How much secular
camouflage is required to sneak a publicly sponsored Nativity scene past the First
Amendment bar on an 'establishment of religion.' "182 This statement demon-
171. Religion and the State, supra note 59, at 1611.
172. Menorah Wars, supra note 6, at 12.
173. Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3103.
174. Id. (emphasis added).
175. Id. (emphasis added).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 3103-04.
178. Id. at 3104. The Lynch display included a Santa Claus, a reindeer, a Christmas tree, and a banner reading
"Season's Greetings," in addition to the crbche or nativity scene depicting the birth of Christ. Lynch, 465 U.S. at
671.
179. Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3104.
180. Id. at 3093.
181. Id. at3113-15.
182. Sanders, supra note 2.
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strates the extent to which the "context" requirement trivializes the constitutional
requirements of the establishment clause. To minorities, the fact that an overtly
religious symbol, representing a particular faith, is part of a wider secular display
does not alter the impression that the government is endorsing the beliefs associ-
ated with the particular symbol. 83
The Allegheny Court held that because the menorah was near the Christmas
tree, which was "primarily" secular, the two symbols taken together conveyed the
message of celebration of a secular holiday season.184 In actuality, members of a
religious majority, or of a particular religion whose beliefs are recognized by a dis-
play, are likely to view the display and conclude that it "accommodates their beliefs
without infringing the religious autonomy of nonadherents."185 To minorities, in-
cluding irreligionists, the message conveyed is that they are "not similarly worthy
of public recognition nor entitled to public support."18 The Court is seemingly
unaware of "the inherent exclusionary impact of such symbols on non-
adherents." 87 The Court's reasoning that context determines the effect of en-
dorsement or non-endorsement of religion is faulty. "The gradual but increasingly
pervasive installment of compromised religious ritual within government itself
thus draws that which was formerly outside to the inside ... ."188 Another au-
thority has similarly stated: "The Court's approach in Lynch . . . thus represents
an inversion of the principle that the religion clauses protect unpopular minorities
against exercises of majority will in matters of religion." 89 This same faulty rea-
soning is evident in the Court's conclusion in Allegheny that the display of the me-
norah does not violate the establishment clause and that the reason the cr&che does
violate the clause is primarily because there are no "secular" symbols displayed
with the creche.
2. Endorsement and Perception
The second constitutional principle agreed upon by the Court in Allegheny was
that "the government's use of religious symbolism is unconstitutional if it has the
effect of endorsing religious beliefs." ' Justice O'Connor relies on the perspective
of an "objective observer" 9' to determine whether the government's action imper-
missibly endorses religion,192 and notes that both the subjective and objective
components of a message determine the perception of that message.19 3 She states
183. Religion and the State, supra note 59, at 1657.
184. Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3114.
185. Religion and the State, supra note 59, at 1657.
186. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 708 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
187. Religion and the State, supra note 59, at 1659.
188. Alstyne, Trends in the Supreme Court: Mr. Jefferson's Crumbling Wall-A Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly,
1984 DUKE L.J. 770, 787 [hereinafter Mr. Jefferson's Crumbling Wall].
189. Religion and the State, supra note 59, at 1659.
190. Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3103.
191. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 76 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
192. Religion and the State, supra note 59, at 1647.
193. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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that "[t]he meaning of a statement to its audience depends both on the intention of
the speaker and on the 'objective' meaning of the statement in the community. "194
In other words, "a symbol has no natural meaning independent of its 'interpretive
community'-the meaning of a symbol depends on the nature of its audience."19
The perception of "endorsement" depends largely upon the outlook of the ob-
server."'9 "Is the objective observer (or average person) a religious person, an ag-
nostic, a separationist, a person sharing the predominate religious sensibility of
the community, or one holding a minority view?"'97 Most importantly, the objec-
tive observer, in the final analysis, becomes the individual Justice sitting on the
Court who must "understand and evaluate a symbol on the basis of an objective
paradigm different from his or her own,""' and "it is far more likely that such a
person will assume the objective observer to be him or herself rather than employ
an external standard."' 9 9 One should deduce from this analysis that predictability
as to future establishment clause decisions can be predicated on the "perceptions"
of the Justices currently sitting on the Court. In other words, "[e]stablishment is
no more than what the Justices perceive it to be. 200
VI. CONCLUSION
Although Justice O'Connor's modifications of the Lemon test restrict the prac-
tice of ascribing to almost any state religious practice "the purpose of preserving
tradition,"' ' and also address the "concern that state religious activities may os-
tracize religious minorities,"2 2 the new test will not realistically change the em-
erging trend toward accommodation of de facto religion when application of the
test is coupled with the context requirement.
It remains unclear, as well, who the objective observer will be whose determi-
nation is dispositive in determining whether or not a symbol "endorses" religion.
If establishment is what the Justices perceive it to be, it will be a far cry from the
Jeffersonian "wall of separation." From a separationist point of view, "the objec-
tives subsumed under the public sphere accommodation rationale, when invoked
to justify the formal, public honoring of religious beliefs by the state, cannot be
squared with the protection of the religious autonomy of minorities. ""3 The rea-
194. Id.
195. Marshall, supra note 33, at 533 (citing Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73,
84-85 (1985)).
196. Id. at 534.
197. Id. at 537.
198. Id.
199. Id. (citing F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY 72-73 (1976)). "The obscenity test is based upon a
judge's or jury's interpretation of the standards of the population as a whole. However, it is more likely that a
judge or jury applies personal standards." Id. at 537 n.243 (citing E SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY 72-73
(1976)).
200. Id. at 537.
201. Lemon Reconstituted, supra note 163, at 475.
202. Id.
203. Religion and State, supra note 59, at 1657.
1990]
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LA W REVIEW
soning apparent in recent establishment decisions "equates majority acceptance
with constitutional acceptability."
20 4
Examination of the Allegheny decision discloses that Justice O'Connor found
the crbche violated the establishment clause,2 °0 but that the menorah next to the
Christmas tree did not.20 ' Four Justices, Kennedy, Rehnquist, White, and Scalia,
believed neither the crbche nor the menorah violated the establishment clause.2"7
This would seem to indicate that in the future, provided "enough" secular symbols
were included in the religious display, five Justices 208 would agree that the display
is not an endorsement of religion. One authority has stated concerning the Lynch
decision, applicable to Allegheny as well, that "[bloth the case and the tendency it
represents are disappointing reminders that religious ethnocentrism, as well as re-
ligious insensitivity, are still with us. I do not know whether Mr. Jefferson would
have been surprised, but I believe he would have been disappointed.
209
Despite properly focusing on "the impact of state actions on nonadherents of
benefitted creeds,"210 Justice O'Connor's refined Lemon test when coupled with
the context requirement imposed by the Lynch and Allegheny decisions, and gov-
erned by the majority perspective on endorsement, will be "inadequately sensitive
to the impact of government actions on religious minorities" in the arena of civil
religion. 211 "The 'Crbche No, Menorah Yes' decision has come in for as much
abuse as the reindeer rule on which it relied."
212
Mary B. Davis
204. Id. at 1656.
205. Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3119 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
206. Id. at 3122.
207. Id. at 3134 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
208. Kennedy, Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, and White, JJ.
209. Mr. Jefferson's Crumbling Wall, supra note 188, at 787.
210. Religion and the State, supra note 59, at 1647.
211. Id. at 1648.
212. Menorah Wars, supra note 6, at 12.
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